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RAPE LAW GATEKEEPING 
COREY RAYBURN YUNG* 
Abstract: Police across the United States regularly act as hostile gatekeepers 
who prevent rape complaints from advancing through the criminal justice sys-
tem by fervently policing the culturally disputed concept of “rape.” Victims 
are regularly disbelieved, rape kits are discarded without investigation, and, as 
a result, rapists remain free. The substantial empirical evidence and stories 
from victims across the United States demonstrate that any success in decreas-
ing sexual violence hinges on removing the numerous police-imposed obsta-
cles inhibiting investigation and adjudication in rape cases, beginning with 
substantial reform of police practices. An examination of modern cases and 
the historical record indicates that the widespread conventional wisdom 
among academics and activists that reforming evidentiary rules and consent 
standards would trickle down to police decisions has proven unwarranted. As 
long as rape victims do not have consistent access to the criminal justice sys-
tem due to policing failures, tinkering with rules and statutes is likely to yield 
little progress. Consequently, reform efforts must prioritize fixing the most 
significant bottleneck in rape cases: police. Several such legal and policy 
changes are incorporated into a model statute designed to ameliorate the wide-
spread, ongoing problems associated with police gatekeeping. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a [person]. . . 
who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he can-
not grant [the person] entry . . . . At the moment the gate to the law 
stands open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the 
[person] bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. 
When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: “If it tempts you 
so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. 
And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand 
gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other . . . .” 
—Franz Kafka1 
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Rape law is broken. 
The systemic gatekeeping of rape complaints in police departments 
across the country substantially limits the effective scope of rape statutes.2 
The conventional view that legislative or judicial action related to rape trials 
can address the failures of the criminal justice system is not viable when 
police bar cases at their inception.3 The essential problem is not rape laws; 
it is the people charged with enforcing those laws. The actual practices of 
police departments reveal law enforcement aimed not at punishing and de-
terring sexual violence but instead policing the culturally disputed concept 
of “rape.”4 This norm of adversarial policing neutralizes legislative attempts 
to improve modern rape law by changing consent standards, substantive 
law, or trial procedures. 
The systemic failure to test rape kits for forensic evidence is just the 
latest example. Approximately 400,000 rape kits have never been tested by 
police departments in the United States.5 Only five states presently make 
testing mandatory.6 Unlike other crime victims, those who have been raped 
are often billed upwards of $1,000 for the invasive, four-to-six hour medical 
exam yielding the critical evidence related to their attack.7 Yet, state police 
labs regularly cast aside those kits with no intent that the evidence ever be 
tested.8 One conclusion from this evidence might be that it is a combination 
                                                                                                                 
 1 Franz Kafka, Before the Law, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 3 (Nahum N. Glazer ed., 1971). 
 2 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 17, 25 (1998); Heather R. Hlavka, Normalizing Sexual Violence: Young Women 
Account for Harassment and Abuse, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 337, 340 (2014). 
 3 See infra notes 208–238 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Melinda Tasca, Nancy Rodriguez, Cassia Spohn & Mary P. Koss, Police Decision Mak-
ing in Sexual Assault Cases: Predictors of Suspect Identification and Arrest, 28 J. INTERPERSON-
AL VIOLENCE 1157, 1158 (2012). 
 5 Caitlin Dickson, How the U.S. Ended Up with 400,000 Untested Rape Kits, DAILY BEAST 
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/23/how-the-u-s-ended-up-with-
400-000-untested-rape-kits.html [https://perma.cc/5WLX-LB3J]. 
 6 Nicholas Kristof, Despite DNA, the Rapist Got Away, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-despite-dna-the-rapist-got-away.
html [https://perma.cc/W6RW-HXLJ]. 
 7 See Nora Caplan-Bricker, Rape Victims Are Still Being Charged for Rape Kits, SLATE (Dec. 
22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2015/12/rape_victims_are_still_being_
charged_for_rape_kits.html [https://perma.cc/AJ2S-JKMC] (discussing the commonness of rape 
kit charges being assigned to the person who was attacked despite federal law attempting to stop 
the practice); see also Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Where Rape Victims Are Forced to Pay for Their 
Own Forensic Exams, REASON (Oct. 9, 2014), http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/09/rape-victims-
charged-for-forensic-tests [https://perma.cc/9F38-ZZ8G]. 
 8 See Laura Finley, It’s Not a Backlog, It’s a Lack of Concern for Rape Victims, COUNTER-
PUNCH (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/01/15/its-not-a-backlog-its-a-lack-of-
concern-for-rape-victims/ [https://perma.cc/4VVC-DRY2]; Tyler Kingkade, Some States Throw 
Untested Rape Kits in the Trash. These Survivors Want to Change That, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 
23, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/untested-rape-kits-in-trash_us_56cb4e5ee4b0411
36f17b087 [https://perma.cc/X9ZA-EJ2Q]. 
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of oversight and cost reduction. The reality, however, is much worse; as one 
officer noted, the kits were not being tested because “the [rape] allegations 
had already been disregarded.”9 Jurisdictions that are now testing discarded 
rape kits, often after delays of more than a decade, have found that over 
one-in-three of those kits contained DNA of persons in criminal databases.10 
Further, police often do not submit the results from tested kits to the Com-
bined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), making the tests essentially useless 
in apprehending the identified rapist.11 It is unknown how many rapists 
have remained free to further victimize because of widespread police deci-
sions to ignore proper rape kit testing procedures.12 
Untested rape kits are the most visible symptom of the United States’ 
crippled and dysfunctional system for prosecuting rapists, but the core prob-
lem is much deeper than the rape kit “backlog.”13 For most rape victims, it 
is not a matter of if but a matter of when the criminal justice system does 
not believe them.14 Those targeted with sexual violence face a level of scru-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1287, 1297 (2016) (“In many respects, the untested [rape] kits were a tangible sign about the dis-
position of these cases . . . . [A]s one police official put it: ‘The kits [that weren’t] tested were 
cases that we couldn’t or wouldn’t do anything about.’” (quoting REBECCA CAMPBELL ET AL., 
NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., THE DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) AC-
TION RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP), FINAL REPORT 105 (2015))). 
 10 See Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio’s Rape Kit Testing Effort Starts to Yield Results, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS (June 29, 2013), http://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/news/state-regional/
ohios-rape-kit-testing-effort-starts-to-yield-resu/nYYkd/ [https://perma.cc/54XW-PGFZ]; Rachel 
Dissell, Almost Two-Thirds of Rapes Reported in Cleveland Never Make It to Court, CLEVELAND 
(May 5, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/05/despite_improvements_
almost_tw.html [https://perma.cc/F3G2-7Z4W]. 
 11 See, e.g., T. Christian Miller et al., Upon Further Review: Inside the Police Failure to Stop 
Darren Sharper’s Rape Spree, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/
police-fail-stop-nfl-darren-sharper-rape-spree [https://perma.cc/GD9B-L8TW]. 
 12 See Rebecca Rosenberg, DA Hailed After Pledging $35M to Eliminate Rape Kit Backlogs, 
N.Y. POST (Nov. 13, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/11/12/da-hailed-for-pledging-35m-to-
eliminate-rape-kit-backlogs/ [https://perma.cc/258V-C745]. 
 13 “Backlog” implies that the untested rape kits were in a queue awaiting testing by overbur-
dened labs. That does not reflect the reality across the United States. In fact, untested rape kits 
were often simply discarded in warehouses, trash depositories, or storage closets with no intention 
to ever test the contents of the kits. See Finley, supra note 8. 
 14 There is no consensus about whether it is better to refer to those who have been raped as 
“victims” or “survivors.” Some prefer the term “survivor” because it focuses on how a person has 
moved past his or her experience of sexual violence. See, e.g., Rhona Dowdeswell, Why I Must 
Forgive to Get Over My Rape, WESTERN DAILY PRESS (Bristol), Jan. 25, 2002, at 8. In contrast, 
Andrea Dworkin offered this explanation for why she thought the “victim” label was more appro-
priate: 
It’s a true word. If you were raped, you were victimized. You damned well were. 
You were a victim. It doesn’t mean that you are a victim in the metaphysical sense, 
in your state of being, as an intrinsic part of your essence and existence. It means 
somebody hurt you. They injured you. 
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tiny and disbelief unique among crime victims.15 Unlike people who have 
been robbed, beaten, or defrauded, rape victims must bypass a series of 
gatekeepers that, beginning with the police, impede the criminal justice sys-
tem from vindicating victims’ allegations.16 Victims often find that law en-
forcement agents spend far more time and effort policing their perceived 
definition of “rape” than policing rapists. In rape cases, police gatekeeping 
is the rule, not the exception.17 
Ultimately, police are the largest obstacle to the prosecution and con-
viction of rapists in the United States. Police disbelieve rape victims far 
more often than the public and other agents involved in rape investiga-
tions.18 Research shows police believe “rape myths”19 at a much higher rate 
                                                                                                                 
Andrea Dworkin, Woman-Hating Right and Left, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON 
FEMINISM 28, 38 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990). Others prefer the term 
“victim” because it better enables them to confront their past experience of rape. See, e.g., Kate E. 
Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 308 n.6 (1995); Dana Bolger, “Hur-
ry Up and Heal”: Pain, Productivity, and the Inadequacy of ‘Victim vs. Survivor,’ FEMINISTING, 
http://feministing.com/2014/12/10/hurry-up-and-heal-pain-productivity-and-the-inadequacy-of-
victim-vs-survivor/ [https://perma.cc/4L9Z-ZUER] (“Compulsory survivorship depoliticizes our 
understanding of violence and its effects. It places the burden of healing on the individual, while 
comfortably erasing the systems and structures that make surviving hard, harder for some than for 
others. You are your own salvation. You are your own barrier to progress.”). This Article uses the 
term “victim” because of those latter arguments and because it is a label that connects those who 
have been raped with the universal category of crime “victims.” Nonetheless, this decision con-
flicts with the conclusions of some persons who have been raped and, for that, this Article offers 
sincere apologies. 
 15 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 17–18 (analyzing how unique social attitudes hostile to 
rape victims create a gap between the letter of the law and law as applied); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, 
RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 6–7 (1999) (discussing several ways that rape 
victims are treated differently than other crime victims); Amanda Hess, What Cops Are Really 
Thinking When a Woman Claims She Was Raped, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2014/11/18/how_cops_respond_to_rape_a_new_study_of_officers_at_one_police_
department.html [https://perma.cc/W3JN-L5KK] (summarizing a recent research study about 
police hostility to victims of sexual violence). 
 16 See Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to Justice: Police and Prosecutorial Response to Sexual 
Assaults Against Women, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 268 (1990) (using the “gateway” 
metaphor for understanding the difficulties that rape victims have with the criminal justice sys-
tem); Tasca et al., supra note 4, at 1158 (“There are multiple decision points at which attrition in 
sexual assault cases occur, including actions taken by victims, police officers, prosecutors, juries, 
and judges.”). 
 17 See Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
13 (2010) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on Rape in the United States] (statement of Carol E. Tracy, 
Women’s Law Project) (“[W]e are seeing chronic and systemic patterns of police refusing to ac-
cept [rape] cases for investigation, misclassifying cases to non-criminal categories so that investi-
gations do not occur, and ‘unfounding’ complaints by determining that women are lying about 
being sexually assaulted.”). 
 18 See COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (1995) (finding that twenty-four percent of police did not believe that a 
victim was harmed by rape if she was sexually experienced in contrast to eleven percent of law-
yers, six percent of doctors, and three percent of counselors). 
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leading to widespread distrust of rape victims; seventy-nine percent agree 
that “many women secretly wish to be raped” and sixty-five percent agree 
that women with “bad reputations” make the most rape complaints.20 As a 
result, police often conclude that rape complaints are false without investi-
gating or, in some cases, even interviewing the victim.21 Embodying the 
strong norms in many police departments, and in contradiction of decades 
of research on false reporting,22 one sheriff recently told reporters that “the 
majority of our rapes that are called in are actually consensual sex.”23 Such 
attitudes have led the International Association of Chiefs of Police to une-
quivocally state that “the most significant barrier to successful prosecutions 
of rape is a failure on the part of the police to take rape victims seriously.”24 
Research shows that police departments failed to investigate approximately 
one million forcible rape complaints from 1995 to 2012.25 
This Article calls for new legislation and a fundamental reorientation 
of scholarly efforts targeting gatekeeping in rape cases. Without greater at-
tention to the large stumbling blocks at the initial phases of criminal inves-
tigation of rape, the coming decades will likely resemble the many deficien-
                                                                                                                 
 19 See id. 
 20 Amy Dellinger Page, Judging Women and Defining Crime: Police Officers’ Attitudes To-
ward Women and Rape, 28 SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM 389, 401 (2008). 
 21 See, e.g., Katie J.M. Baker & Alex Campbell, When Detectives Dismiss Rape Reports Be-
fore Investigating Them, BUZZFEED (Sep. 8, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/
unfounded?utm_term=.cfDqvMerAZ#.faqz7rnvo3 [https://perma.cc/FC6Z-DLWH] (“Police rou-
tinely did little to no detective work at all, labeling rape reports unfounded after cursory interviews 
with the victims. Detectives who are trained to handle sex crimes often never even met or spoke 
with the alleged victim, but instead dismissed the allegation simply after reviewing a case report 
made by a beat cop.”). 
 22 See generally CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXU-
AL ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP 
WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPART-
MENT, AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 49 (2012) (finding a false 
reporting rate of approximately four and one-half percent); David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C. 
Nicksa & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Re-
ported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329 (2010) (finding a nearly six percent rate 
of false sexual assault reports in a study of police case files); Kimberly A. Lonsway, Trying to 
Move the Elephant in the Living Room: Responding to the Challenge of False Rape Reports, 16 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1356, 1366 (2010) (reviewing the voluminous research about false 
reporting rates for rape and concluding that the rate is between two percent and eight percent, 
which is not high for crime reporting). 
 23 Kimberlee Kruesi, Idaho Sheriff: ‘The Majority of Our Rapes That Are Called in Are Actu-
ally Consensual Sex,’ SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.sltrib.com/home/3667481-
155/story.html [https://perma.cc/TLX5-VGHN] (quoting Sheriff Craig Rowland). 
 24 Lisa Avalos, Britain Is Violating Rape Victims’ Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/02/britain-violating-rape-victims-
human-rights [https://perma.cc/AK27-EHXT] (discussing the international problem of police 
refusing to take rape complaints seriously). 
 25 Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1239–40 (2014). 
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cies of the last thirty years in regards to decreasing sexual violence. A few 
basic reforms described in this Article could make far greater gains in deter-
ring and punishing rape than substantive redefinition of the crime. This Ar-
ticle includes a description of the needed legal changes as well as model 
federal and state statutes in the Appendixes. Hopefully, by paying greater 
attention to the real impediments to rape law enforcement, rapists will be 
incarcerated instead of finding more victims.26 
Part I of this Article examines empirical and institutional evidence of 
police acting as aggressive and hostile gatekeepers toward rape victims to 
the detriment of preventing future sexual violence.27 Part II explores the 
various harms caused by police gatekeeping in rape cases.28 Part III outlines 
a set of legal and policy reforms that could substantially reorient police 
practices so that criminal law in the United States could finally meet its 
promise of preventing and punishing sexual violence.29 
In presenting research in this area over the last several years,30 many 
audiences have become essentially numb to the statistics showing the po-
lice’s systemic disregard of rape complaints. As a result, at the beginning of 
the subsections throughout this Article, narrative accounts (in italics) illus-
trate the key concerns described in those subsections. Hopefully, these ac-
counts of injustice for rape victims will resonate with certain audiences 
whereas neither dry statistics nor legalese would.31 Some are quite lengthy, 
but it is important that they be read. The stories show misconduct that no 
morally sensible person can support and should alarm us all. They also il-
lustrate that we cannot dismiss the problems of rape law as isolated or mere 
mistakes. Something is truly rotten in American rape law. 
I. WIDESPREAD GATEKEEPING 
To fully grasp the failings of modern rape law enforcement, it is help-
ful to explore a little history.32 State legislatures have substantially changed 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Rosenberg, supra note 12. 
 27 See infra notes 32–163 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 164–236 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 237–278 and accompanying text. 
 30 See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault: An Empirical 
Examination, 21 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y., & L. 1 (2015) (applying statistical methods showing 
widespread indifference to rape and sexual assault complaints by municipal police departments 
and universities); Yung, supra note 25. 
 31 See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 983–87 (1991) 
(contending that narrative descriptions of rape can have greater persuasive value than other means 
of conveying similar facts and evidence). 
 32 Throughout this Article, the primary focus is on cases generally considered to be rape under 
state laws. State laws, however, are not wholly consistent on that subject. For example, at least for 
the highest degree of sexual violence crimes, half of the states still require the prosecution to 
prove the defendant used or threatened force in addition to the other elements of rape. See MODEL 
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the substantive criminal laws regarding rape over the last forty years.33 Be-
fore the nationwide rape law reform beginning in the 1970s and 80s (“re-
form period”), the traditional elements of the crime of rape were “(1) sexual 
intercourse; (2) between a man and a woman who is not his wife; (3) 
achieved by force or a threat of severe bodily harm; and (4) without her 
consent.”34 In the pre-reform era, courts imposed the utmost resistance re-
quirement, even when not explicitly part of rape statutes, so that there was 
no “rape” as a matter of law, unless a victim resisted to her dying breath.35 
The utmost resistance requirement was still applied to overturn jury verdicts 
at least through 1973.36 Importantly, the force element of rape statutes was 
wholly separate and unrelated to the non-consent element such that sex was 
deemed as consensual if the victim “voluntarily” submitted to the rapist af-
ter use or threat of force.37 Courts did not consider victims who succumbed 
to anything short of deadly abuse to have been raped.38 
                                                                                                                 
PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 36–41 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion 
Draft No. 2, Apr. 28, 2015). Further, some states do not use the term “rape” at all, preferring the 
label “sexual assault” for even forcible, nonconsensual, penetrative sex acts. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2016). It should be noted, however, that all but two states have criminal-
ized, as a felony, non-forcible, non-consensual sexual contact in some circumstances. See ALA. 
CODE §§ 13A-6-61 to -62 (LexisNexis 2016); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410–.427 (2016); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-1406 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103 to -127 (2016); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 261–264 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT § 18-3-402 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-70 to 
73a (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 770–774 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3002 to -3005 (2016); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-1 to -22.2 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§§ 707-730 to -733 (2016); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101, -6104 (2016); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-
1.10 to .30 (2016); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503, -5505 (2016); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020–.060 (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41–:43 (2016); ME. 
STAT. tit. 17-A § 253 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 22 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 750.520b–d (2016); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–.3451 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-65, -71 
(2016); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 566.030–.034 (2015) (effective Jan. 1, 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 45-5-502 to -503 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-317 to -322.04 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 200.366 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1 to A:4 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 
(West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 ( 2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00–.52 (McKinney 
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to .3 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, -04, -07 
(2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02–.07 (LexisNexis 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 1111–
1116 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305–.312 (2016); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121–3127 (2016); 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2 to -8.4 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -656 (2016); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-1 to -2 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502 to -506 (2016); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, -.021 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, -405 (Lex-
isNexis 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3252–3253 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2016); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040–.100 (2016); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-3, -5 (2016); WIS. STAT. 
§ 940.225 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302 to -306 (2016). But see IOWA CODE §§ 709.1–.4 
(LexisNexis 2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303 to -304 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 33 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2000). 
 34 Id. (citations omitted). 
 35 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 590 (5th ed. 2009). 
 36 People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (App. Div. 1973). 
 37 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 19. 
 38 Id. at 19–20. 
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Feminists criticized such doctrines and rules, leading successful efforts 
to reform rape laws in every state.39 Most states enacted several major statu-
tory changes suggested by feminist reformers: rape became a gender-neutral 
crime; all types of sexual penetration, not just vaginal intercourse, were 
criminalized; rape shield laws were adopted; and marital rape was finally 
made illegal.40 After the initial wave of legislative reforms, some jurisdic-
tions eliminated the force requirement as well.41 Although there was a burst 
of action by state legislatures during the reform period, substantive criminal 
rape law has remained relatively static. 
There is widespread scholarly consensus that such reforms have made 
only slight differences in the application of rape law.42 Indeed, rape law’s 
failure to address the social ill of rape after the reform period is well docu-
mented.43 Courts continue to circumscribe the statutory language in rape 
cases so that it is interpreted narrowly.44 Juries remain skeptical of rape vic-
tims, meaning that convictions are rare.45 Some states showed modest pro-
gress, but most states’ reforms had no measurable effect.46 For example, 
even in states without a statutory force requirement, many police and prose-
cutors still do not investigate or prosecute cases without clear evidence of 
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 40 See Bryden, supra note 33, at 319, 321. 
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Bryden, supra note 33, at 320 (citations omitted). 
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actual or threatened force.47 A verbal “no” by the victim is not usually dispos-
itive of non-consent for police and prosecutors in some parts of the country.48 
A few states still maintain formal resistance requirements, albeit at a lower 
threshold than the utmost resistance standard of the prior era.49 
By the late 1990s, observers generally agreed that a significant gap be-
tween engrained cultural beliefs and the letter of the law effectively negated 
legal reform efforts to substantially diminish the rate of rape.50 The consen-
sus about why rape law reform failed is perhaps best captured in Dan Ka-
han’s characterization of the “sticky norms” and “hard shoves” involved in 
the social understanding of rape.51 Kahan concluded that:  
Empirical studies suggest that a substantial percentage of men and 
women behave consistently with the [“no sometimes means yes”] 
norm, either because they perceive that women who consent too 
readily will be deemed “promiscuous” or because they believe that 
their partners view a certain degree of sexual aggression as allur-
ing.52 
Police have become the enforcers of those social norms that excuse conduct 
that substantive rape law otherwise defines as criminal. 
A. A Model of Failure 
In September of 2008, Sowell raped, choked, and beat a woman in his 
home.53 She was able to escape his grasp and fled to a bathroom. There she 
saw a decomposing, headless woman’s body wrapped in plastic. She ran 
from Sowell’s house and called the police. Her later testimony described her 
condition at the time: “I couldn’t walk no more. I was tore up. My body was 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 4–10 (discussing numerous cases and scenarios in which 
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CHI. L. REV. 607, 607, 623–24 (2000). 
 52 Id. at 623 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 53 Michael Daly, Cleveland Kidnapping, Anthony Sowell Case Linked by Indifferent Police, 
DAILY BEAST (May 8, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/08/cleveland-
kidnapping-anthony-sowell-case-linked-by-indifferent-police.html [https://perma.cc/H6VV-Z34H]. 
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tore up. . . . My face, my female parts, my butt.”54 The police would neither 
take a rape report over the phone nor send a squad car to pick her up de-
spite her vivid retelling of the horrors she experienced and witnessed. She 
said the treatment she received during her 911 call made her feel “less than 
human.”55 The police did not investigate further. 
About three months later, Sowell kidnapped and brutally beat Gladys 
Wade.56 While bleeding from Sowell’s attacks, she escaped Sowell’s house, 
flagged down police officers, and told them that Sowell had tried to rape 
her.57 The police went to Sowell’s home, found Wade’s blood on the stairs, 
and arrested Sowell.58 The house smelled of “death” emanating from sev-
eral decomposing corpses hidden there at the time.59 Sowell’s neighbors 
had made numerous complaints about the horrific odor coming from his 
house.60 Nonetheless, police officers at the scene made no effort to identify 
the source of the ghastly smell. 
At the station, police decided to release Sowell because he stated that 
Wade had attacked him first and they discovered that Wade had a criminal 
record.61 The police detective in the sex crimes unit further cited “insuffi-
cient evidence” in Wade’s story to designate her complaint as “unfound-
ed.”62 Police did not even bother to check the sex offender registry or other 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. (quoting an unnamed victim of Anthony Sowell). Rape victims have only been named 
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 56 Easy Prey (CNN television broadcast Nov. 7, 2010) (quoting Gladys Wade). 
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DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2011, at 2 (2012) 
(“When, through investigation, an agency determines that complaints of crimes are unfounded or 
false, the agency eliminates that offense from its crime tally through an entry on the monthly re-
port.”). After a complete investigation of a rape complaint, police departments are permitted to not 
count a crime in official tallies to the FBI if the complaint was determined to be “unfounded.” INT’L 
ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NAT’L LAW ENF’T POLICY CTR., INVESTIGATING SEXUAL ASSAULTS 
216 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:205 
criminal databases, where Sowell was listed due to his prior conviction for 
rape.63 Sowell would rape and kill at least six more women after the police 
chose to ignore Wade’s allegations.64 
In April of 2009, a woman in Cleveland Heights reported that Sowell 
kidnapped her from a bus stop and repeatedly raped her at his home.65 The 
victim went to a local hospital where she was administered a forensic rape 
kit examination.66 According to the police report, the woman had “numer-
ous scratch marks on her neck and hands, . . . areas of her scalp where hair 
had been ripped out during a struggle,” and a raspy voice “due to strangu-
lation.”67 The Cleveland Heights police investigated her complaint only 
minimally but never ordered testing of DNA found during her rape kit ex-
am.68 Because his DNA was in the available criminal databases, such test-
ing could have led to Sowell’s arrest before he found more victims.69 
In October of 2009, several onlookers, including a few city workers, 
discovered a still-naked woman outside of Sowell’s residence.70 Someone 
summoned an ambulance. Indifferent bystanders simply took pictures on 
their cell phones of the nude woman lying in the grass rather than render-
ing assistance. A nearby security surveillance camera captured all of this. 
Sowell told the small crowd and paramedics that he was having sex with his 
wife when she accidentally fell out of the window. The paramedics let Sow-
ell ride along with the woman, who had severe injuries from her fall, in the 
ambulance to the hospital. Despite the oddities and untruths in Sowell’s sto-
ry, police did not investigate further. Again, the police failed to check Sow-
ell’s prior criminal history. 
Finally, in September of 2009, Sowell encountered a victim persistent 
enough to overcome police intransigence. Sowell asked a 36-year-old wom-
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2017 Rape Law Gatekeeping 217 
an to come back to his place to have a beer.71 At his house, Sowell choked 
her with an extension cord and repeatedly raped her.72 She convinced Sow-
ell to let her go by telling him that she would return to his house the next 
day.73 Instead, the woman immediately reported Sowell to the police. The 
sex crimes detective assigned to the case chose not to follow up on the rape 
complaint because “the woman had waited to go to the hospital.”74 Still, it 
took police over one month after the woman reported being attacked to go 
to Sowell’s house with an arrest warrant.75 
When police finally served the arrest warrant for Sowell, they discov-
ered a scene straight out of a horror movie. There were eleven women’s 
bodies rotting under the floors and in the walls of the house.76 A decompos-
ing human head was in a bucket in the main hallway. Because of the grue-
some details and substantial evidence, the prosecution of Sowell was effort-
less. After the jury found Sowell guilty, a judge sentenced him to death.77 
Among the many terrors and missteps involved in the Sowell case, the 
question we have to ask is how could this happen? Indeed, high-ranking 
police and government officials insist that police acted properly in investi-
gating Sowell. Twenty-year force veteran and decorated officer Ed Tomba 
stated that “[the police have] done a very good job . . . . [They] have a solid 
protocol.”78 Martin Flask, the Cleveland mayor’s appointee for police over-
sight, concluded that “the investigator did a good job.”79 Cleveland Chief of 
Police Michael McGrath had “nothing but praise for his department” in 
their decisions in the Sowell case contending that the officers “were very 
vigilant in what [they] did.”80 It is not surprising, then, that Sowell is just 
one in a long line of serial rapists who Cleveland police ignored.81 
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The awful and horrifying reality of the mishandled Sowell case, as 
well as the substantial empirical evidence of police hostility to victims, can 
only be explained by viewing our criminal justice system regarding rape 
through the lens of gatekeeping, not enforcement. As the Cleveland police 
and mayor’s response to the mistakes made in the Sowell investigation indi-
cate, they believed the system was operating as intended. 
The crime funnel, a basic model of criminal justice administration, il-
lustrates the importance of gatekeeping in the failure of rape law reform.82
The core insight of the crime funnel model is that, as cases move through 
the system, there is inevitably attrition.83 At each stage of a criminal case, 
there is the potential that an actor in the system will discard the case. The 
pattern of active cases decreasing in number while advancing through dif-
ferent stages of the criminal justice system resembles a funnel.84 The crime 
funnel is a helpful model for understanding the systemic effects of police 
gatekeeping in rape cases. Figure 1 below illustrates the six major stages in 
the criminal justice system where an actor can prevent a rape complaint 
from moving to the next stage: victim, police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and 
appeal. 
Figure 1: Crime Funnel of Rape Case Gatekeeping 
The levels of the hierarchy of rape case gatekeeping are not isolated. 
Recently, researchers have begun to emphasize how obstacles at the early 
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stages of the criminal justice process have substantial spillover effects.85 
Many victims do not move past the first level because they do not believe 
they will receive justice at a later stage.86 Police often fail to investigate 
rape cases because of instructions from local prosecutors who do not want 
to pursue anything short of “slam dunk” prosecutions to maintain high con-
viction rates.87 The best evidence indicates less than one percent of rapes 
actually result in a prosecution.88 Trial judges sometimes dismiss cases be-
cause they believe a jury would never convict.89 Appellate courts ultimately 
shape the substance and procedures that juries, judges, prosecutors, and po-
lice enforce and apply.90 
Police exhibit normalized gatekeeping behavior in numerous ways that 
create substantial triage effects at the initial stages of the crime funnel. When 
interviewing rape victims, some police departments regularly used hostile 
interrogation techniques.91 Furthermore, prosecutors and police threaten or 
actually prosecute rape victims for filing false complaints, even in cases 
where forensic evidence and confessions ultimately validate their rape com-
plaints.92 High-ranking police officers deter victims from reporting crimes so 
that their departments can meet statistical goals.93 Recent research and data 
show a pattern of under investigating and under counting rape in police de-
partments across the country.94 In many cases, police have assured victims 
that they were busy working on their cases, but there was no actual investiga-
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tion because the complaint had already been labeled “unfounded.”95 The level 
of disregard for rape victims exhibited by police across the United States is 
simply too high to continue to ignore or dismiss.96 
The decisions of police to ignore rape complaints are also almost com-
pletely unchecked.97 Consider the story of Anthony Sowell at the beginning 
of this Section. In a narrow sense, many of the victims described were the 
lucky ones—they had their accounts eventually validated. More often, vic-
tims simply go through life with people doubting their stories. In many 
ways, it is incredible that these rape victims were vindicated. Because po-
lice disbelieved their stories, there was little or no investigation performed. 
Only because of the later capture of the rapist were their stories proven true. 
Yet, with systemic disregard by police of rape complaints in departments 
across the nation, one can only wonder how many other rapists are still on 
the loose because authorities did not believe their victims. There is simply 
no accountability for police who refuse to follow up on rape complaints.98 
Academic field research also shows widespread police hostility to rape 
allegations. A study of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) and 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department illustrate several ways that police 
act as gatekeepers by using heuristic rules to disbelieve victims.99 The 
LAPD still imposed a corroboration requirement in determining whether to 
arrest or pursue charges in rape cases even though it was removed from 
statutes long ago.100 One detective explained that “[y]ou don’t want to arrest 
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someone and put a rape charge on them for the rest of their life . . . .”101 Re-
inforcing the police dismissiveness of rape victims, prosecutors would pres-
sure police not to pursue cases in order to maintain high conviction percent-
ages—the primary statistic by which they are evaluated.102 The net result of 
the revived corroboration requirement and prosecutor instruction was a self-
reinforcing cycle where “detectives' decision-making is influenced by their 
perceptions of whether charges will be filed by the district attorney's office, 
and prosecutorial decision-making is influenced by the context in which the 
police present the case.”103 
Professor James F. Gilsinan’s study of general police culture practices 
is also helpful in understanding how police practices become institutional-
ized. Gilsinan explored how police officers’ cultural beliefs manifest in 
their classifications of crime based upon specific organizational frames.104 
He found that “police agencies do not respond directly to a situation but 
instead respond to an organizationally projected frame that takes ambiguous 
information and forms it into an understandable pattern to which the agency 
can then respond in a routine fashion.”105 Gilsinan’s key finding was that, in 
determining whether an allegation of criminality was true, police necessari-
ly used their imbedded cultural beliefs to process, frame, and comprehend a 
complainant’s story.106 The strong biases against alleged rape narratives 
found in general American and law enforcement culture would lead police 
to classify rapes as either, in the best case, lesser crimes or, more often, as 
non-criminal events.107 Even well-intentioned officers succumb to the 
strong cultural norms and narratives constantly reinforced through police 
training, leading them to believe that rape victims’ complaints are false far 
more often than in reality.108 
B. Systemic Failure 
The tragic story of the ongoing failure of the New Orleans Police De-
partment (“NOPD”) to investigate rape complaints begins in 2009. It was 
that year that the Times-Picayune first uncovered practices by the city po-
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lice that indicated widespread gross indifference to rape victims.109 Among 
various signs of gatekeeping, police used a code phrase, “Signal 21,” to 
categorize approximately sixty percent of all rape complaints as “noncrimi-
nal” matters.110 Although “Signal 21’s” can be used for a variety of legiti-
mate reasons, police are expected to follow up with each complaint, a prac-
tice that NOPD systemically declined to do with rape complaints.111 
As with other cities across the country, the NOPD’s motive for misclas-
sifying and not investigating rape claims was to create the statistical ap-
pearance of greater success in fighting violent crime.112 New Orleans be-
came so bold in misclassifying and ignoring rape complaints that its report-
ed rape rate unbelievably fell below the reported murder rate in the city.113 
The NOPD denied any wrongdoing but refused to make its records availa-
ble for public examination.114 After the public outcry and political fallout 
from the Times-Picayune investigation, a new group of police officers took 
over the NOPD sex crimes cases and promised significant changes.115 The 
police department was also placed under federal court supervision leading 
to a subsequent consent decree with the Department of Justice requiring the 
NOPD to undertake numerous reforms.116 
Just five years later, however, a state audit of the NOPD’s handling of 
rape cases found even greater problems during the period of 2011 to 
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2013.117 Investigative journalism from local media, this time The New Or-
leans Advocate, and the New York Times supplemented the state audit.118 In 
total, the media and state auditor found that the NOPD sex crimes unit 
failed to investigate over 840 cases in three years by designating those re-
ports as “miscellaneous” matters.119 
Beyond the gross numbers, individual cases illustrated heinous disre-
gard of sexual assault complaints in New Orleans. In one instance, police 
failed to investigate a case where a two year old arrived in an emergency 
room with a positive test for a sexually transmitted disease.120 Another de-
tective assigned exclusively to sex crimes cases stated in front of nurses and 
victims that he refused to investigate because he “did not believe that sim-
ple rape should be a crime.”121 Based upon the NOPD’s continuous willful 
neglect of rape cases, it is impossible to know how many rapists have re-
mained free because of the Department’s actions. It was during this time 
frame, however, that former professional football player Darren Sharper 
raped women in the city with impunity.122 Indicative of similar problems on 
a national level, Sharper raped women with no investigation from police in 
at least three other cities as well.123 
Several dedicated local reporters have uncovered extensive police 
mishandling of rape complaints in other cities as well. In 2012, Justin Fen-
ton of the Baltimore Sun exposed his city’s widespread failure to investigate 
rape cases while also substantially misreporting its data submissions as part 
of the Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”) program submitted to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).124 From 1995 until 2010, the Baltimore 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Campbell Robertson, New Orleans Police Routinely Ignored Sex Crimes, Report 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/us/new-orleans-police-
special-crimes-unit-inquiry.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/M6SU-C74U]. 
 118 Id.; see also John Simerman, IG Report Slams Work of 5 NOPD Sex-Crimes Detectives, 
NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/
article_76a1d452-bf80-5895-8de7-63ed4a479867.html [https://perma.cc/CE6D-LGFJ]. 
 119 See Robertson, supra note 117; John Simerman, Marchers Protest Failures in NOPD’s Han-
dling of Rape Allegations, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.theadvocate.
com/new_orleans/news/article_4287955b-9d5f-51ae-9d57-8816f226461e.html [https://perma.cc/
4FZP-KUXL]. 
 120 Robertson, supra note 117. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Ryan Gabrielson, T. Christian Miller, John Simerman & Ramon Antonio Vargas, 
Upon Further Review: Inside the Police Failure to Stop Darren Sharper’s Rape Spree, NEW OR-
LEANS ADVOCATE (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/article_
4e659d1a-87c0-5d63-883d-738a66c38e22.html [https://perma.cc/79P3-6GGZ]. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Fenton, supra note 62(detailing the role of the Baltimore Sun in uncovering police 
underreporting of rape to the FBI). The UCR are the primary means of measuring violent crime in 
the United States. See NATHAN JAMES & LOGAN RISHARD COUNCIL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34309, HOW CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES IS MEASURED 2 (2008) (“UCR data are now used 
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Police Department reported that the rate of rape declined by an amazing 
seventy-seven percent in the city.125 Fenton’s investigation demonstrated 
that the marked decline was a myth and the product of the police’s institu-
tionalized statistical manipulation.126 Instead, police were simply discarding 
rape complaints with minimal or no investigation at all.127 
The story of the Baltimore police failing to investigate rape cases is 
noteworthy, in part, because it illustrated the deeply embedded beliefs among 
many police in that department. Baltimore Police Commissioner Frederick H. 
Bealefeld III identified the cultural roots of police distrust of rape accusations 
and stated that the Baltimore Police Department “didn’t just suddenly veer off 
the road and strike a tree—this was a very long process that led to this prob-
lem.”128 Police in Baltimore, and elsewhere, necessarily operate within larger 
cultural superstructures embodying “rape myths” while internalizing added 
elements unique to law enforcement.129 
Similar media investigations exposed systemic police failures in rape 
cases in Philadelphia and St. Louis.130 The exposed police departments did 
                                                                                                                 
extensively by academics and government officials for research, policy, and planning purposes, 
and the data are widely cited in the media. The UCR also provides some of the most commonly 
cited crime statistics in the United States.”); SIEGEL, supra note 93, at 30 (“The UCR is the best 
known and most widely cited source of official criminal statistics.”). But see Lonsway & Archam-
bault, supra note 95, at 149 (noting the limitations of relying on UCR data and concluding that 
“[widespread citation to the UCR] is . . . likely attributable to the credibility afforded by the FBI’s 
prominent support of the [UCR], which may understandably lead public officials, members of the 
media, and the public to conclude that the UCR is the authoritative source for information on 
crime reporting”). The UCR is based upon data submitted by ninety-eight percent of police de-
partments in the United States to the FBI. See JAMES & COUNCIL, supra, at 5–6 (citing statistics 
for 2005). 
 125 Fenton, supra note 95. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 Erica Goode, Rape Definition Too Narrow in Federal Statistics, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/federal-rules-on-rape-statistics-criticized.
html [https://perma.cc/ZKY4-4YKZ] (quoting Commissioner Frederick H. Bealefeld III). 
 129 See Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 217, 218 (1980); Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Re-
view, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133, 134 (1994) (defining “rape myths” as “attitudes and beliefs 
that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male 
sexual aggression against women”); Kathryn M. Ryan, The Relationship Between Rape Myths and 
Sexual Scripts: The Social Construction of Rape, 65 SEX ROLES 774, 774–75 (2011). 
 130 See Mark Fazlollah, Michael Matza & Craig R. McCoy, How to Cut City’s Crime Rate: 
Don’t Report It, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 1998, at A01; Jeremy Kohler, Waivers Wipe Out Re-
ports of Rape, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Aug. 29, 2005, at A1; Maggi, supra note 109; Michael Mat-
za, Victims’ Testimony at Congressional Hearing Show “Chronic Failure” in Rape Investigations, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nsvrc.org/news/3068 [https://
perma.cc/F456-LUR8]. 
2017 Rape Law Gatekeeping 225 
not adequately investigate rape complaints but also created the appearance 
of low crime levels by using several difficult-to-detect techniques.131 
Empirical research found that those four cities caught aggressively 
dismissing rape complaints are hardly alone.132 Between 1995 and 2012, of 
jurisdictions containing populations of at least 100,000 people, at least for-
ty-six out of 210 police departments providing UCR data significantly un-
dercounted the number of rapes reported to police.133 In doing so, they like-
ly conducted no investigation, labeled the reports unfounded, or counted the 
rapes as lesser offenses all while creating the impression that rape was de-
clining.134 In total, this research found that approximately one million rapes 
were not included in the UCR.135 Such cases, by virtue of the techniques 
used to hide them, were neither properly investigated nor prosecuted. 
Further, not only have these police departments been underreporting 
rape, the rate of systematic undercounting and disregarding of rape com-
plaints has steadily increased since 1995, as Figure 2 shows.136 
  
                                                                                                                           
 131 The FBI simply has not supervised the UCR data to deter misreporting by police depart-
ments. See Michael D. Maltz, Missing UCR Data and Divergence of the NCVS and UCR Trends, 
in UNDERSTANDING CRIME STATISTICS 269, 270 (James P. Lynch & Lynn A. Addington eds., 
2007). As a result, police have developed three widely used techniques, uncovered in the media 
investigations. First, police departments have abused the UCR rule that “an agency determine[d] 
that complaints of [rape were] unfounded or false.” FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 
62 (“When, through investigation, an agency determines that complaints of crimes are unfounded 
or false, the agency eliminates that offense from its crime tally through an entry on the monthly 
report.”); see Kohler, supra note 130; Fenton, supra note 124; Maggi, supra note 109. Second, the 
police departments suppressed rape incident counts by classifying rape complaints as lesser of-
fenses that were not reported to the FBI through the UCR program. See Yung, supra note 25, at 
1223–24. Third, many police officers would simply create no written report that a complaint was 
even made. According to one investigation of the Baltimore police practices, forty percent of rape 
complaints were disposed of with neither a written report nor an investigation. Senate Hearing on 
Rape in the United States, supra note 17; see also Kohler, supra note 130; Matza, supra note 130; 
Fenton, supra note 95. 
 132 See Yung, supra note 25, at 1221–25. 
 133 See id. at 1237. 
 134 See id.; supra note 131 and accompanying text.  
 135 See Yung, supra note 25, at 1239–40. 
 136 Figure 2 previously appeared in Yung, supra note 25, at 1238. 
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The undercounting that results from police gatekeeping has a chilling 
impact. During the 1970s, one out of two rape reports led to an arrest.137 
Since 2005, that rate has dropped to one out of every four rape reports.138 
Figure 3 shows that the rate of clearance of rape cases by police has de-
clined from approximately fifty percent to about forty percent of reported 
rapes from 1999 to 2010.139 
 
 Despite the widespread evidence of police gatekeeping, stories of po-
lice mistreatment of rape victims are often characterized as “isolated acts” 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 95, at 150. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Rape Cases Cleared, 1999-2010 
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or as the result of a few bad apples in the police force.140 Defenders of the 
status quo point toward inconsistencies in the stories of traumatized victims 
to defend police hostility to rape complaints.141 Some say that intoxicated 
victims are the real problem.142 They refer to “Duke Lacrosse” or the “Roll-
ing Stone article on UVA” as though those outlying cases are at all typical 
of rape victim reports.143 Activists claim that men are railroaded by a crimi-
nal justice system based upon radical feminist conceptions of sexual vio-
lence.144 They contend that false reporting, and not rape, is the real con-
cern.145 
Such defenses of police mishandling of rape complaints are untenable 
against the substantial evidence demonstrating systemic police hostility to 
victims of sexual violence.146 The institutional and narrative evidence of 
police gatekeeping is consistent with empirical academic research and me-
dia investigations regarding police handling of rape cases. The media often 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See, e.g., Craig R. McCoy & Nancy Phillips, City Freed from Police-Sex Suit, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2006, at B01 (quoting Philadelphia’s police commissioner Sylvester M. John-
son as stating that rapes committed by police officers in his jurisdiction and subsequent mishan-
dling of the case were “isolated acts”). 
 141 Brett Erin Applegate, Prior (False?) Accusations: Reforming Rape Shields to Reflect the 
Dynamics of Sexual Assault, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 899, 924–25 (2013). 
 142 See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, The Obama Administration’s Deserving Victims, NAT’L REV. 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/377492/obama-administrations-deserving-
victims-heather-mac-donald [https://perma.cc/3CXY-PET7] (“The alleged campus-rape epidemic 
could be stopped overnight if women’s advocates sent a simple message to girls: Don’t get drunk 
and get into bed with a guy whom you barely know.”). 
 143 See, e.g., A.J. Delgado, Crying Rape, NAT’L REV. (May 19, 2014), http://www.national
review.com/article/378310/crying-rape-j-delgado [https://perma.cc/X387-NBT9] (citing the in-
dictment of Duke lacrosse players as evidence about “how far the pendulum has swung in the 
other direction! Now, the term ‘rape’ or ‘sexual assault’ is thrown around almost effortlessly, 
accusations easily made and lives easily ruined . . . . After all, for every legitimate, actual rape 
claim there may be another that was not: a girl who cried rape.”); Thomas Sowell, Sexual Assault 
on Campus, NAT’L REV. (May 13, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/377804/sexual-
assault-campus-thomas-sowell [https://perma.cc/7TVX-RLBX] (“Have we already forgotten the 
lynch-mob atmosphere on the Duke University campus a few years ago, when three young men 
were accused of raping a stripper? Thank heaven that case was handled by the criminal-justice 
system, where all the evidence showed that the charge was bogus, leading to the district attorneys 
being removed and disbarred . . . . There are many unintended consequences of lynch-law policies 
that poison the atmosphere on campus and diminish American life in general.”). 
 144 See Cassia Spohn, Clair White & Katharine Tellis, Unfounding Sexual Assault: Examining 
the Decision to Unfound and Identifying False Reports, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 162 (2014). 
 145 See, e.g., Christina Hoff Sommers, Rape Culture Is a ‘Panic Where Paranoia, Censorship, 
and False Accusations Flourish,’ TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/100091/campus-sexual-
assault-christina-hoff-sommers/ [https://perma.cc/9YHN-CV2K] (“Cases [based upon false accu-
sations] are proliferating . . . . The list of falsely accused young men subject to kangaroo court 
justice is growing apace . . . . It appears that we are in the throes of one of those panics where 
paranoia, censorship, and false accusations flourish—and otherwise sensible people abandon their 
critical facilities.”). 
 146 See infra notes 237–278 and accompanying text. 
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fixates on the rare false reports of rape with little attention given to the 
widespread failure to investigate rape complaints.147 Indeed, individuals are 
likely far more familiar with the Rolling Stone article about the University 
of Virginia—even though no alleged rapist was ever named or prosecuted—
than the numerous stories of police failings throughout this Article. 
The best data indicates that police, at a systemic level, often fail to in-
vestigate even forcible stranger rapes. Until very recently, the federal gov-
ernment has only tracked rapes involving force, vaginal penetration, and 
women victims, so observed police manipulation of such data indicates a 
general disregard of cases that most informed commentators believe are the 
most likely to be investigated.148 
C. Distribution of Failure 
In St. Louis, throughout 2002, police received reports from prostitutes 
who had been kidnapped and raped.149 Erinn Steinbeck called 911 after es-
caping her attacker. She reported that she had been held captive for two 
days and raped repeatedly. A sex crimes detective took her to the police sta-
tion but created no written report of her allegations. Instead, the officer 
created an informal memorandum regarding Steinbeck, a practice the St. 
Louis Police Department used at the time to avoid having to count incidents 
of rape in their official crime statistics.150 The document dismissed Stein-
beck as “intoxicated” and “mentally ill.”151 
Steinbeck pleaded with the officers to let her take them to where she 
had been held against her will. Instead, a detective called Steinbeck’s moth-
er telling her to pick up Steinbeck. Steinbeck stated that a sex crimes detec-
tive told her, “Nobody is going to believe a crackhead. All the guy would 
have to say is that he didn’t pay her and she was upset.”152 
Later in the year, another prostitute reported being abducted, beaten, 
and raped. The officer who met her observed clear injuries to her face. Fol-
                                                                                                                           
 147 Kenneth Dowler, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: The Presentation of Sex Crime in Local Tele-
vision News, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 383, 385 (2006). 
 148 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
2013: RAPE ADDENDUM (2014); Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-statistics-
to-expand-rape-definition.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2FBX-DAEK]. See generally Yung, supra 
note 25. 
 149 See Jeremy Kohler, Missing Patterns, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 2005, at A1, 
available at 2005 WLNR 24322959 (describing the facts of the Maury Travis investigation as 
discussed in this Section unless otherwise noted). 
 150 See Kohler, supra note 130 (describing the various methods, including informal memoran-
dums, that St. Louis police used to avoid recording rapes in department statistics). 
 151 Kohler, supra note 149. 
 152 Id. (quoting Erinn Steinbeck). 
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lowing proper procedure, the officer referred the case to the sex crimes sec-
tion. Again consistent with department practice at the time, however, the sex 
crimes detective only created a memorandum regarding the case. Unlike the 
previous complainant, this most recent victim knew her attacker: Maury 
Travis. Nonetheless, police did not investigate further. 
It is unknown how many women Travis raped or killed. Police believe 
that he raped and murdered as many as twenty. It is also unclear how many 
women were raped or killed after the initial complaints were made and ig-
nored by the St. Louis Police Department. Travis targeted prostitutes specif-
ically, which helped him escape police attention. When Travis was finally 
arrested, he committed suicide while in jail. As a result, the government 
made no effort to determine the effects of police ignoring early accusations 
of Travis’s rapes. 
The failure of the criminal justice system in the United States is not 
evenly distributed. All of Anthony Sowell and Maury Travis’s victims were 
black. They were also often sex workers and/or drug addicts.153 The stories 
from New Orleans as well as the recent prosecution of Oklahoma City po-
lice officer Daniel Holtzclaw also fit a pattern wherein black victims in ma-
jority-minority neighborhoods are least likely to be believed by police.154 
There is substantial evidence that police simply take the rape reports of 
whites more seriously.155 Focusing crime prevention efforts on certain 
neighborhoods can also cause substantial disparities along racial lines. 
Race and ethnicity have long created unusual patterns in rape law en-
forcement. For example, rape claims from victims who are black women 
and other women of color are regularly ignored regardless of the race of the 
perpetrator.156 Before the Civil War, black women, even those who had been 
“freed,” were sexually victimized with little concern by prosecutors for 
their defilement.157 In modern America, black women have still not been 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See Chen, supra note 61. 
 154 See Lilly Workneh, Daniel Holtzclaw and the Reality of Police Brutality Against Black 
Women, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/daniel-holtzclaw-
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 155 Katharine M. Tellis & Cassia C. Spohn, The Sexual Stratification Hypothesis Revisited: 
Testing Assumptions About Simple Versus Aggravated Rape, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 252, 252 (2008). 
 156 See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies 
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recognized as rape victims because they have been perceived as overly 
promiscuous and not capable of being defiled.158 
Instead, the fear of female defilement through rape has primarily been 
focused on myths about wild black men terrorizing white women. The 
“Black beasts” narrative has long dominated rape law and was famously 
exemplified in trials of the “Scottsboro Boys,” wherein black teenagers in 
the South were wrongfully convicted for rape and sentenced to death.159 
The death penalty for rape was largely derived from lynchings of blacks in 
southern States and almost never applied to white defendants.160 
Other populations also experience greater levels of police hostility to 
their rape complaints. A survey of police showed that, given no other infor-
mation about the rape complaint, only forty-eight percent said they would 
believe a male victim.161 This has led to male-to-male rapes being ignored 
across the United States.162 Transgendered populations, despite being sub-
ject to higher rates of sexual violence, are also less likely to be believed by 
police.163 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF GATEKEEPING 
There are tremendous consequences associated with the collective de-
nial of rape complaints, first exhibited by police toward victims when they 
report having been attacked. These harms go well beyond any justification 
that might be proffered for not investigating rape complaints due to resource 
constraints. The most significant results to gatekeeping can be effectively 
divided into three major categories: allowing rapists to find more victims, 
creating widespread distrust of the criminal justice system, and orienting 
reform efforts away from the greatest impediments to diminishing the level 
of sexual violence in the United States. 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See id. at 22–23 (“Although the laws no longer defined crimes and punishments by race of 
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Data, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 170, 173, 176 (2009). 
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A. Rapists Remain Free 
In 2004, Wilbur Brown raped Sara Reedy.164 Yet police decided to treat 
Reedy as the sole criminal suspect in their investigation. Reedy worked at a 
Gulf gas station in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Cranberry Township. Wilbur 
Brown entered the station, brandished a gun, emptied the cash register, and 
raped Reedy. Brown ordered Reedy to perform oral sex on him and to swal-
low all of his semen, threatening to shoot her if she did not comply.165 After 
Brown left, Reedy ran to a neighboring gas station and called the police. 
Officers at the scene described Reedy as “crying, shaking, . . . and [] hys-
terical.”166 
Detective Frank Evanson first met Reedy at a local hospital where 
Reedy underwent a rape examination. Detective Evanson asked Reedy how 
many times she did “dope” every day.167 He called her a liar and accused 
her of making up the rape to cover her theft of the gas station’s cash regis-
ter. Detective Evanson told Reedy’s mother and stepfather that Reedy’s story 
was not credible because she reported that the station was robbed at 10:40 
PM, the exact time the cash register was recorded to have opened, and 
“nobody that’s in this kind of a hysteria would know exactly what time it 
was.”168 
Within three months after Brown attacked Reedy, he robbed another 
location where he sexually assaulted his victim in a manner very similar to 
his attack of Reedy.169 Detective Evanson was assigned to the new case as 
the lead investigator.170 He completely ignored the similarities of the two 
cases. In subsequent civil litigation, the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit documented the incredible connections between Reedy’s case and the 
other complaint: 
Both occurred in Cranberry Township, separated by 3 months. 
Both occurred at businesses located on Route 19, approximately 
1.5 miles apart from one another. Both attacks occurred at the 
same time of evening—approximately at 10:40 p.m. In both at-
tacks, the assailant made no effort to conceal his identity. In both 
attacks, the female victim was assaulted while at work or while 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the facts of the Maury 
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leaving work. Both victims described their assailant as a Cauca-
sian male with brown (Reedy) or light brown hair (Landmark), 
wearing blue jeans. Both victims described their assailant as be-
ing around the same age. The Landmark victim described her as-
sailant as in his late-30s while Reedy described her assailant as 
in his mid-30s to early 40s. In both attacks, the assailant used a 
black handgun. Both victims were robbed, in addition to being 
sexually assaulted. Both victims were ordered to bare their 
breasts and had their breasts fondled by the assailant. Both vic-
tims were forced to perform oral sex upon the assailant.171 
Instead of investigating the two cases as likely perpetrated by the same of-
fender, Detective Evanson began drafting an affidavit for a criminal com-
plaint against Reedy for filing a false police report.172 At the same time, De-
tective Evanson received a report that the DNA from the second attack 
(there was none obtained after Reedy’s attack) matched a known criminal. 
Evanson, however, decided to focus his energies at Reedy. 
Detective Evanson went to Reedy’s house with a marked police car for 
backup.173 For forty-five minutes, he browbeat Reedy in front of her neigh-
bors, telling her to change her statement and admit that she had invented 
her rape story.174 Despite Reedy’s steadfast commitment to her statement to 
police, Detective Evanson sought and obtained an arrest warrant for 
Reedy.175 Reedy was arrested and bond was set at $5,000 because Detective 
Evanson insisted that Reedy was a flight risk.176 At the time, Reedy was 
four-months pregnant and, because she was unable to pay her bail, held in 
jail.177 After receiving a bail reduction, she was released while she awaited 
trial.178 
Thirteen months after Brown raped Reedy, police in another jurisdic-
tion apprehended Brown.179 Brown confessed to twelve sexual assaults, in-
cluding his rape of Reedy.180 Brown raped at least two women after Reedy 
filed her initial complaint while police focused their investigation on 
Reedy.181 The prosecutor finally decided to drop the charges against 
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Reedy.182 Reedy settled a civil suit against Cranberry Township, but the 
town refused to admit that the authorities acted wrong in any way.183 After 
the settlement, the Cranberry Township Town Manager stated that “[T]here 
was no wrongdoing. Every action [Detective Evanson] took was approved 
by all law enforcement agencies involved and at every level . . . . It was just 
unfortunate.”184 Detective Evanson was not disciplined and suffered no ad-
verse employment action.185 
Every time a valid rape complaint is not fully investigated, a rapist is 
left free to find more victims.186 Ignoring rape complaints emboldens and 
reinforces the criminal behavior of rapists who can continue their sexual 
violence with impunity. As the Sowell and Travis cases indicate, the failure 
to investigate sometimes leaves murderers free as well. 
Yet, police are often blind to this substantial risk because of their belief 
in various myths about rape. For example, one prominent rape myth identifies 
the motivation for sexual assault as exclusively sexual.187 Another widespread 
myth is that women falsely report rape after they regret having had consensu-
al sex.188 Police in particular are more likely to discount the effects of rape if 
they perceive a victim to be sexually experienced.189 
Rape myths have long been a concern and object of study. In 1980, Mar-
tha Burt defined rape myths as “prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about 
rape, rape victims, and rapists.”190 Kimberley Lonsway and Louise Fitzgerald 
softened the emphasis on falsity by characterizing rape myths as “attitudes 
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and beliefs that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and 
that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against women.”191 
For Lonsway and Fitzgerald, “false or apocryphal” rape myths “serve 
to justify existing cultural arrangements.”192 Such beliefs are not innocu-
ous—they discourage victims, embolden rapists, and shape society’s beliefs 
so as to support rapists while disbelieving victims.193 Dolf Zillman and 
James Weaver called rape myths “the most self-serving justification of sex-
ual coercion ever invented by callous men.”194 As a result, the culturally 
engrained mistaken ideas, further distorted and magnified through media, 
shape public discourse, policy formulation, and agenda-setting concerning 
rape.195 Rape myths ultimately serve to increase social tolerance of high 
levels of sexual violence.196 Police, in particular, are more likely to discount 
the effects of rape if they perceive a victim to be sexually experienced.197 
Rape myths create cognitive biases among police officers that blind 
them to the real costs of leaving rapists free. No rational, morally sensible 
person would believe that allowing a rapist to find more victims is justified 
by an officer’s gut feeling that a rape complainant is lying. Because officers 
have integrated various rape myths into their belief systems, however, their 
motivated reasoning causes them to simply discount the real risk of ongoing 
sexual violence. 
B. Illegitimacy 
In December of 2000, in East Baltimore, Maryland, a nineteen-year-
old woman reported that a man threated her with a pocketknife and forcibly 
removed her from a city park.198 Her attacker raped her after he had re-
moved her from public sight. After her rapist released her, the woman re-
ported her victimization to the authorities. Police doubted her story because 
they believed it was too outlandish and farfetched. Although she underwent 
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a medical examination to determine if there was forensic evidence of rape, 
police did not order testing of the resultant rape kit. Police browbeat the 
victim during multiple interrogations in an attempt to uncover inconsisten-
cies in her story. 
When the rape victim found that she was pregnant, police became con-
vinced that she invented a rape story to cover for having cheated on her 
boyfriend. The police designated her claim as “unfounded” and performed 
no further investigation. They also made no effort to determine if there were 
other complaints similar to the one by the victim. 
Almost a decade later, a laboratory finally tested the victim’s rape kit 
in response to growing public attention focused on the issue of untested 
rape kits. A DNA sample from semen obtained from the victim’s body 
matched Lawrence Mosley, who was already in prison for another crime. 
Mosley’s DNA was also found in a second rape kit, containing evidence de-
rived from a different rape in Baltimore with a similar modus operandi, col-
lected two days before the aforementioned attack in East Baltimore. Police 
similarly disbelieved the prior victim, who was also nineteen years old, be-
cause they thought she made up the rape story to hide the fact that she was 
sexually active. 
After forensic examiners identified the DNA match, the second victim 
refused to cooperate and testify against Mosley because of the degradation 
and humiliation she suffered during repeated interrogations over a week by 
the police when she made her initial complaint. Thus far, prosecutors have 
not charged Mosley with either rape even though his DNA was found on the 
victims. 
The damage to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system because of 
police gatekeeping has been significant. Unlike the stories earlier in this 
Article, the story of Lawrence Mosley contains no hint that justice will be 
done. Rape reporting is extremely low with only about one third of the vic-
tims of rape reporting it to the police.199 One reason may be that victims 
have internalized police gatekeeping. Police serve a central role in the crim-
inal justice system’s legitimacy in regards to rape cases.200 If the police de-
cide that there is insufficient evidence for a rape prosecution, the public (in-
cluding rape victims) interprets that conclusion to mean that there was no 
rape. As the criminal funnel model predicts, the spillover effects from police 
gatekeeping create a cycle that insures even fewer rapists will be appre-
hended and prosecuted. 
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Research shows that over half of rape cases are short circuited at the 
victim stage when those who have been raped fail to report being at-
tacked.201 The decision not to report, however, does not occur in isolation. It 
is based in part upon a victim’s assessment about the estimated likelihood 
that reporting being raped will lead to arrest and punishment of the rapist.202 
If a victim believes that reporting will only bring humiliation with little 
chance for case advancement, the individual rational choice is to not re-
port.203 As a result of the interdependence of the actors involved with rape 
cases, breakdowns at any early level have magnified effects. For example, if 
police gain a reputation as hostile toward rape victims, those victims report 
fewer incidents.204 The role of police reputation is particularly important 
because no case proceeds until it moves past the officers of the law. Among 
all of the possible gatekeepers in the criminal justice system, police are the 
most significant independently because of the collateral effects they create 
throughout the crime funnel. Any effort to increase prosecutions and con-
victions of rapists will fail as long as police exercise aggressive triage pat-
terns during the intake and investigation of rape complaints. 
Such results fuel a vicious cycle of perceptions of illegitimacy about 
the criminal justice system, leading to greater victim non-reporting and non-
cooperation. Even if police allow the case to move to the prosecution stage, 
there are still several hurdles before a conviction, which is the only clear 
signal to the public that there was a rape. When the legitimacy of the crimi-
nal justice system is called into doubt, civilians simply see no reason to par-
ticipate within it.205 
High levels of gatekeeping reinforce the already low levels of rape re-
porting by telling victims that there is no justice to be had by filing a com-
plaint. Enforcement of rape law fundamentally depends on victims’ actions. 
If victims do not report their attacks, cases are virtually impossible to pros-
ecute. If victims cease cooperating during the investigation or trial, there is 
almost no chance for a conviction. As a result, legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system in the eyes of victims is absolutely essential to the proper 
functioning of rape law. If rape victims do not trust the police, there can be 
little hope of positive change even with broad statutory enactments hoping 
to change the substantive law of rape. 
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C. Mistaken Focus 
In 2003, Anthony Alliano broke into the home of sixteen-year-old 
Meaghan Ybos.206 Alliano wore a ski-mask, held a knife to Ybos’ throat, and 
put a blanket over her face while he raped her.207 Ybos underwent a rape kit 
exam, but it would not be tested for another nine years.208 Because Alliano 
was able to hide his face during the attack, the substantial delay in testing 
Ybos’ rape kit prevented any chance of linking Alliano to her rape. Looking 
back at the aftermath of her attack, Ybos recently concluded “[t]he law en-
forcement response was worse than the rape. . . . I was just interrogated as 
if I was a suspect myself. They kept saying, ‘You know you can go to jail for 
making this up, right? You’re not just doing this for attention, right?’”209 
In 2004, police found Alliano, who was thirty-three at the time, in a 
motel room with an apparently drugged sixteen-year-old girl.210 The victim 
had a rape kit exam but it was not tested until eight years later.211 Alliano 
confessed to having sexually penetrated the girl twice, but prosecutors dis-
missed the charges against him.212 
In total, Alliano sexually assaulted at least seven victims in their Mem-
phis-neighborhood homes before finally being prosecuted.213 At least five of 
those victims were after Ybos reported her attack.214 Local prosecutors have 
stated that they were unaware of Alliano’s reign of sexual violence because 
police repeatedly acted as gatekeepers.215 At least three rape kits were 
gathered with Alliano’s DNA but either were not tested or not put into 
CODIS at the time.216 As of 2014, Memphis had at least 12,000 untested 
rape kits, the highest per capita rate in the United States.217 As part of her 
efforts to bring greater attention to police hostility to rape victims, Ybos 
remarked: “You start to wonder, is rape really illegal? . . . Apparently, it 
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was not a big deal for the nine years Alliano was on the loose. The law says 
it’s illegal, but in practice, if nothing’s done, I have to wonder, is it really 
illegal?”218 
Stories like Alliano’s highlight how little effect efforts to redefine rape 
or change rape cases’ evidentiary rules will have on actual rape prosecutions. 
Gatekeeping relegates rape law reform to an entirely academic pursuit—in 
the worst sense of the word. For example, although it might ideally make 
sense to implement an affirmative consent standard (colloquially referred to 
as “yes means yes”), enacting such a rule would be a mistake in modern 
America.219 It would make little to no positive difference on the amount of 
cases that get through police gatekeeping because police would continue to 
discard rape complaints and implement a definition of “rape” far narrower 
than the statutes. Furthermore, the backlash that has already emerged when 
such standards have been adopted for colleges and universities shows that 
cultural retrenchment undermining reform would potentially cripple rape law 
further. The practical realities of rape law in America leaves Americans far 
away from a cultural environment where such proposals are considered palat-
able and, therefore, enforceable. As a result, efforts should be focused not just 
on correcting trial or evidence rules but instead upon altering the behavior of 
police and other gatekeepers in the criminal justice system. 
The common focus on trial procedures and rules has led to erroneous 
conclusions about desirable policy reform. For example, research has indi-
cated that forensic evidence gathered from rape kits is rarely introduced at 
trial.220 This research led many to believe that post-rape medical exams 
were of limited utility in rape cases.221 This belief reinforced the behavior of 
police not to test rape kits. More recent scholarship, however, clearly shows 
that police are far more likely to arrest suspects if there is forensic evidence 
available even if it is never used at trial.222 Using trials as a proxy for over-
all rape law practice is often misleading. 
The history of rape law and culture shows that attempts to fix rape law 
have aimed at fixing the wrong stages of the criminal justice system. Ste-
phen Schulhofer offered perhaps the clearest explanation of the pernicious 
effects of cultural norms in shaping the understanding of rape: “Social atti-
tudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify the theories and doctrines 
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found in the law books. The story of failed [rape law] reforms is in part a 
story about the overriding importance of culture, about the seeming irrele-
vance of law.”223 Similarly, Andrew Taslitz extensively catalogued and ana-
lyzed the numerous ways that rape stories are invalidated in the criminal 
justice system through gatekeeping practices.224 The hostile attitudes that 
infect police work neutralize the effectiveness of trial or appellate level so-
lutions to sexual violence. Although spillover effects in the crime funnel 
give hope that changing trial rules will alter police behavior, history has 
shown there is little hope in that regard. The collateral implications of po-
lice gatekeeping, however, have been substantial because police discretion 
has been used to keep rape cases from ever advancing to the courtroom. 
The various proposed piecemeal measures designed to reform substan-
tive rape law and evidence rules in rape cases should generally be depriori-
tized in favor of police reforms.225 The misplaced focus on substantive leg-
islative solutions to the problems of rape law may actually worsen adversar-
ial policing. The “myth of radical change” has long haunted rape law re-
form.226 When activists convinced state legislatures to enact numerous re-
forms, the public falsely believed that far more radical laws were enact-
ed.227 As a result, there has been a long-term mismatch between the applica-
tion of the law and the public’s ideas about its scope. The public’s belief 
that police and courts apply rape legislation broadly has contributed to cul-
tural backlash against rape law.228 The growing intransigence has made a 
particularly “sticky norm” against accepting the values embedded in rape 
law reforms.229 Continued legislative efforts will likely fuel opposition to 
rape law while failing to overcome police gatekeeping, rendering such re-
forms futile. The heightened level of resistance to rape law might ultimately 
cause police, jurors, and judges to rebuff attempts to prosecute rapes be-
cause they mistakenly believe rape law has gone too far.230 
To understand how such a focus could do more harm than good, con-
sider the recent public and media reaction to state and university actions to 
allow discipline of students using a so-called “affirmative consent” stand-
ard. After President Barack Obama called for greater efforts to address sex-
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ual violence at universities in January of 2014,231 the backlash was swift 
and severe.232 Political agendas instantly overrode any pragmatic and 
thoughtful consideration regarding university student sexual assault.233 
The idea that an affirmative consent standard might cure the shortcom-
ings of modern rape law is a dangerous one. Implementing such a rule 
might simply repeat the errors of the prior reform era. Another hard shove 
against a sticky norm might accomplish little when it does not address po-
lice gatekeeping in any significant way. The resultant backlash, however, 
could substantially undermine the willingness of institutional actors to en-
force rape law even further.234 
Fixating on how to change the decisions of jurors, judges, and even 
prosecutors will do little or nothing to change the stage where most rape 
cases fails: police investigation.235 Because police arrest less than seven 
suspects for every hundred rapes,236 more attention must be paid to the body 
of cases that are filtered out before trial. Empirical and narrative evidence 
shows that the bottleneck in rape cases is substantial and proposed solutions 
to sexual violence should be tailored accordingly. 
III. ADDRESSING GATEKEEPING 
Because of the long-term, systemic nature of police gatekeeping of rape 
complaints, it would be easy and convenient to assume that the problem is 
simply intractable. Indeed, many academics and activists have essentially 
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concluded as such because of the embedded social attitudes that have under-
mined rape law reform.237 Such cynicism, however, has tremendous costs. It 
results in focus on misplaced solutions and often underestimates the positive 
potential of certain targeted policing reforms to make a significant difference. 
Model federal and state statutes embodying the proposals described below are 
included at the end of this Article, in Appendix A and B, respectively. 
A. Resource Utilization 
In 2008, an eighteen-year-old woman in Lynnwood, Washington, known 
only as “D.M.” in court filings, reported that she was tied up, threatened with 
a knife, and raped over a period of hours in her home.238 She alleged that her 
rapist avoided leaving evidence by wearing gloves and a mask, using wet 
wipes, forcing her to brush her teeth and shower, and taking her bedding 
and clothes with him. As police would discover much later, D.M.’s rapist 
also took photographs while he raped her. 
Rather than investigate her accusation, the police dismissed her com-
plaint as the product of an overactive imagination. Officers threatened that 
she would lose her state-subsidized housing if she failed a lie-detector test 
they wanted her to take. The victim’s foster parents and friends similarly 
doubted her because of perceived inconsistencies in her story. As a result of 
police intimidation, she decided not to pursue her criminal complaint fur-
ther. Rather than simply let the case go, prosecutors charged D.M. with fil-
ing a false police report. To avoid higher criminal penalties and put the 
matter behind her, she pled guilty, paid a $500 fine, and agreed to mental-
health counseling. 
Colorado police later found pictures of D.M. from the attack, as well 
as her identification card at the home of a serial rapist, Marc O’Leary. 
O’Leary confessed to multiple rapes in Washington and Colorado, includ-
ing of D.M., leading to a prison sentence of over 300 years. Police in Wash-
ington reimbursed D.M. for the $500 fine she paid based upon her guilty 
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plea for filing a false report. D.M.’s subsequent lawsuit against the city was 
settled for $150,000. 
There are numerous resources for rape investigation that are substan-
tially underutilized. First, rape kits should be tested as part of normal police 
practice. The value of rape kit testing is simply too high to ignore. Although 
the mass of untested rape kits in the United States is sometimes referred to 
as a “backlog,” the reasons for its existence show the term is inappropri-
ate.239 The decision to not test rape kits is often a deliberate and conscious 
one. Further, any resource constraints that might have existed have been 
cured through federal allocations for rape kit testing.240 The evidence is 
substantial that even skeptical police are more likely to pursue cases with 
positive rape kit matches.241 
Second, police should be required to use the FBI’s Violent Criminal 
Apprehension Program (“ViCAP”) and CODIS in every reported rape 
case.242 The federal government created ViCAP in 1985 to allow for police 
to be able to access data, forensic information, and pattern analysis from 
law enforcement units across the country.243 Despite its potential utility in 
homicide and rape investigations and easy accessibility via the Internet, po-
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lice rarely use ViCAP.244 The result is that police fail to identify serial rap-
ists, such as O’Leary, who move between jurisdictions.245 Further, police 
also fail to submit new information to ViCAP because they do not use data 
for their department’s cases, creating a self-reinforcing cycle undermining 
ViCAP’s incredible potential. A mandate for use upon a rape report would 
solve the collective action and police apathy problems in regard to ViCAP. 
CODIS similarly provides a national DNA database that is not effectively 
used in rape cases. 
Third, and of a more systemic nature, more resources need to be allo-
cated to rape cases instead of broken windows and drug war policing. This 
proposal would require a more radical shift in police priorities but is con-
sistent with numerous other calls for policing reforms in the last few years. 
Adding more officers and money to rape cases can bear direct as well as 
indirect benefits.246 For example, one common justification for aggressive 
disposal of rape cases by police is that investigations are resource and cost 
intensive.247 That lack of resources, however, also encourages police in the 
practice of “cutting corners” and developing bad habits in investigating rape 
cases.248 Providing adequate institutional support and incentives would af-
ford police far more time to investigate rape complaints. By reorienting po-
lice away from traffic stops, stop and frisks, and petty crime and toward 
sexual violence cases, police can be encouraged to treat rape cases as more 
than a triage operation. 
B. Training and Discipline 
In 2008, an eleven-year-old girl in Washington, D.C., Danielle Hicks-
Best, reported to the metropolitan police that she was raped by several men 
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in their late teens and early twenties.249 At the time of her rapes, her parents 
reported to police that Hicks-Best was missing from home. Hicks-Best re-
membered being held in an abandoned building and raped repeatedly 
throughout the night by a number of adult attackers. Her attackers released 
her when someone told the rapists about a flier indicating that Hicks-Best 
had been reported missing. 
Police repeatedly interrogated Hicks-Best to identify inconsistencies in 
her story even though two separate forensic examinations found evidence of 
non-consensual penetration including “vaginal tears, cuts, and scrapes.” 
Regardless of whether the case could have been prosecuted as a forcible 
rape, Hicks-Best was well below the age of consent (sixteen in the District) 
and any sex act with the alleged attackers would have constituted statutory 
rape in the jurisdiction. Nonetheless, police demanded a high level of speci-
ficity from Hicks-Best. Still traumatized and in the same clothes she wore 
during the attack, the eleven-year-old Hicks-Best had trouble remembering 
what had happened. 
Several days after the original rape, Hicks-Best was staying with her 
uncle. He sent Hicks-Best to the corner store alone at night. At that time, 
several young men, including one who she says raped her during her previ-
ous kidnapping, abducted Hicks-Best again. She was taken to the same lo-
cation as before and raped by two of the men who had previously raped her. 
Again, she was reported missing and police found her in the car of a person 
who had found her wandering the streets and was driving Hicks-Best home. 
With her description of one of her attackers, police found and inter-
viewed a twenty-one-year-old man. The man admitted knowing Hicks-Best 
but denied any role in her rape. Rather than investigating further, based 
upon discrepancies in her accounts, prosecutors charged Hicks-Best with 
filing a false complaint. With little legal assistance and confusion about the 
plea deal offered, Hicks-Best entered an Alford plea.250 The court made her 
a ward of the state and Hicks-Best was removed from her family. In re-
sponse to the court’s decision, Hicks-Best turned to her father and said, 
“Daddy, I got raped and I got locked up.”251 
Through Freedom of Information Act requests, the Washington Post 
secured emails between police related to the case.252 In one communication 
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between police lieutenants, the sender concluded “[a]ll sex was consexual 
[sic]. Parents are unable to accept the fact of this child’s promiscuous be-
havior caused this situation.”253 Hicks-Best’s rape kit was never tested be-
cause police concluded that she filed a false report. Because of the Post’s 
2015 investigation of the rapes, the case has been reopened. The police 
have refrained from disciplining any police officers involved in mishandling 
the case “because too much time has passed since problems in the handling 
of the investigation came to light.”254 
The attitudes exhibited by the police in regards to the rapes of Hicks-
Best might seem poor fits for effective training. That conclusion underval-
ues the research showing how carefully designed training programs have 
shifted police attitudes.255 Regardless, for those police officers that do not 
respond to training, discipline provides a secondary mechanism for insuring 
police officers assigned to rape cases do not act like those investigating the 
Hicks-Best attacks. If systemic indifference to rape complaints impedes ap-
plication of consistent disciplinary measures, civilian oversight or com-
plaint mechanisms could be established. 
The best available evidence has concluded that targeted training can 
have a real impact on policing practices in rape cases.256 When activists 
identify problems with policing, there are often vague calls for better train-
ing. What is sometimes missing, however, are specific proposals for reform-
ing practices that have been shown to have positive effects. Many approaches 
to better policing practices are proven to make meaningful differences direct-
ly relevant to overcoming police hostility for victims.257 Evidence shows that 
well-designed cultural awareness training programs can make significant dif-
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ferences in the handling of cases involving ethnic, racial, and sexual minori-
ties.258 Making police aware of neurobiology research about how victims of 
trauma respond can overcome their distrust of rape victims.259 The simple 
fact is that most police officers involved in rape cases have no training re-
garding rape victims.260 
Also, police training conducted in combination with prosecutor train-
ing has shown positive effects as well. As the crime funnel illustrates, police 
do not make their decisions in rape cases in isolation.261 Prosecutors in par-
ticular can shape the heuristics and police methods so that they are not as 
distrusting of rape victims.262 As discussed earlier in regards to the LAPD 
field research, prosecutors gave specific instructions to police officers to only 
pursue cases with corroborating evidence and force.263 Combining training 
for prosecutors and police can help prevent either miscommunication or rein-
forcement of negative police practices.264 
When training fails, police officers who fail to investigate rape com-
plaints need to be held accountable. Norms of discarding rape cases without 
any inquiry do not develop overnight. Removing the bad apples from rape 
cases as well as providing a clear disciplinary system can supplant hostile 
norms in police departments.265 
C. Aligning Incentives 
In the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City, in 2002, 
Daryl Thomas committed at least seven sexual assaults before police finally 
caught him.266 Police would likely have apprehended him sooner if they had 
investigated the numerous complaints against him.267 Instead, the police who 
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interviewed his victims downgraded the reported offenses to low-priority des-
ignations such as “criminal trespassing.”268 
New York Police Department (“NYPD”) Detective First Grade Harold 
Hernandez eventually arrested Daryl Thomas, leading to the discovery of 
prior bungled police efforts. When Officer Hernandez interrogated Thomas 
for his last sexual assault, Thomas admitted to committing similar crimes 
on “seven or eight” prior occasions, all within two months of his arrest in 
the Washington Heights neighborhood.269 Officer Hernandez was surprised 
because there had been no alert issued regarding a wanted offender match-
ing Thomas’ description. Thomas provided the dates and locations of his 
prior attacks to Officer Hernandez. This information allowed Officer Her-
nandez to comb through police records to see if those attacks were reported 
and, if so, how they were investigated. 
To the officer’s horror, in the six instances where Thomas’ sexual as-
saults had been reported, none of the cases had been classified as rapes or 
even lower-level sexual assaults. Instead, police had categorized the crimes 
alleged as misdemeanor trespass and, in one case, criminal possession of a 
weapon. The facts of the cases told a different story: Victims alleged that 
Thomas had kidnapped them at knifepoint, often in apartment hallways, be-
fore sexually assaulting them in their homes. With the information gathered 
by Officer Hernandez, prosecutors were able to indict Thomas for multiple 
counts of sexual assault resulting in a total sentence of fifty years imprison-
ment.270 
The reason for prior downgrading and misclassifying the sexual of-
fenses was to make the precinct’s crime statistics look better on paper by 
having fewer violent crimes reported.271 As the NYPD switched its policing 
to the CompStat system that linked precinct success to statistics of reported 
crimes, high ranking officers would regularly pressure officers to down-
grade sexual offenses to petty crimes. None of the officers or their com-
manders were disciplined for what was, and continues to be, widespread 
police practice. In the case of Daryl Thomas, he attacked at least seven vic-
tims after the first report to police of his criminal sexual conduct in Wash-
ington Heights. 
The manner through which the police gatekeeping involved in the Daryl 
Thomas case became public also illustrates the systemic pattern of police 
failing to investigate rape complaints. In 2008 and 2009, NYPD Officer Adri-
an Schoolcraft, serving in the 81st Precinct of the NYPD in Brooklyn, decided 
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to turn his investigative skills toward uncovering the corruption among his 
colleagues and superiors.272 Officer Schoolcraft had become outraged by the 
widespread corruption he had observed in the NYPD. To that end, he began 
surreptitiously recording his interactions with other officers. The recordings 
that Officer Schoolcraft later made available to the Village Voice included 
numerous instances of command officers personally calling victims to intimi-
date them into withdrawing complaints, ordering the downgrading of crimi-
nal offenses to make the Precinct’s key crime statistics look better, and linking 
compensation and promotions to individual officer crime statistics. When 
other police officers in the 81st Precinct discovered Officer Schoolcraft’s 
notes about police corruption, they tried to discredit him. Deputy Chief Mi-
chael Marino went with other officers to Schoolcraft’s home. They forced 
Schoolcraft to a psychiatric care facility where they had him involuntarily 
committed for six days.273 There was no actual evidence that Officer 
Schoolcraft suffered from any mental illness and the facility repeatedly resist-
ed efforts to admit him before succumbing to pressure from the police.274 The 
officers hoped to create a record that Officer Schoolcraft was mentally ill so 
that his allegations would be disbelieved. They did not know that he had re-
cordings validating his notes and the police intrusion in his house leading to 
the involuntary commitment. 
When the Village Voice released Officer Schoolcraft’s tapes, dozens of 
current and retired officers came forward to offer similar stories of police 
mishandling of investigations.275 Among them was Officer Hernandez. He 
provided the newspaper with the evidence showing how police had allowed 
a serial sexual offender, Daryl Thomas, to remain loose through gatekeep-
ing practices widely used at the time. Without Officer Schoolcraft’s coura-
geous actions, the story of police unscrupulousness in regard to Daryl 
Thomas would likely have never been made public. 
The research and stories throughout this Article have indicated that 
many rape cases are not investigated because of intentional conduct and not 
because of mere mistaken beliefs. These intentional acts are often the result 
of department policies that actually create incentives for ignoring rape com-
plaints. Statistical policing in particular has either caused or exacerbated 
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many of the problems outlined in this Article.276 That is, police have in-
creased gatekeeping practices in response to political and institutional pres-
sures to meet benchmarks for decreased crime.277 Moving away from such 
statistical goals, at least in sexual violence cases, would eliminate one of the 
primary motives for police to dismiss rape complaints at early stages of in-
vestigation. Further, it would allow police to reorient training problems so 
that paper clearances are not incentivized. 
The culture in the NYPD that led Adrian Schoolcraft to spy on his co-
workers was the product of a system that rewarded failure and condemned 
actual investigation. That is because police officers were judged by clearing 
cases whether or not they actually investigated the underlying complaint. 
Officers wishing to keep their jobs and/or advance their careers viewed rape 
cases as a waste of time and resources. NYPD captains regularly reinforced 
such behavior by telling officers to discourage complaints to meet statistical 
quotas.278 Such practices must be banned for norms to change in police de-
partments. 
CONCLUSION 
The attitudes of police are often more hostile and dismissive of rape 
victims than those exhibited in the general population. The gatekeeping 
mentality of police toward rape victims is both a symptom and cause of the 
general cultural hostility toward stories of sexual violence. Consider the 
numerous stories of victims reporting rapes peppered throughout this Arti-
cle. All the events described have occurred since the turn of the millennium 
and cannot be dismissed as shortcomings of past practices.279 Individually, 
each account could be just an anomaly to a functioning criminal justice sys-
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tem. Collectively, however, they paint a picture of problems far more sys-
temic in nature. Each narrative contains instances of what most would con-
sider egregious police misconduct and are horrific to read in their entirety. 
Common symptoms of gatekeeping are present in each example. 
At some point, it must be asked if the American criminal justice sys-
tem can continue to abide the systemic injustices in modern rape law. How 
can anything or anyone justify the Washington, D.C. police choosing not to 
investigate an eleven year old’s kidnapping and gang rape by adults be-
cause—as a police lieutenant’s emails indicate—officers believed that “[a]ll 
sex was consexual [sic] [and] [p]arents are unable to accept the fact of this 
child’s promiscuous behavior caused this situation”?280 How is it acceptable 
that the police sex crimes unit in New Orleans conducts absolutely no in-
vestigation in a case in which a two year old tested positive for a sexually 
transmitted infection and classifies over 1,300 rape complaints in three 
years as non-criminal matters?281 How have decades of rape law reform 
produced little to no differences in the rate at which rape cases are prosecut-
ed and fewer still that result in conviction?282 
A remarkable aspect of the stories discussed in this Article is that they 
involved rapes by strangers. Longstanding conventional wisdom has been 
that the criminal justice system is generally reliable, or at least more relia-
ble, in addressing stranger complaints.283 Yet, police aggressively rebuffed 
complaints even with evidence of substantial physical injuries and the iden-
tity of the perpetrator. In a world where police regularly dismiss complaints 
of violent stranger rapes, an intoxicated victim of non-stranger rape with no 
outward injuries stands little chance in seeing his or her claim investigated. 
Although the narrative accounts provide one lens for understanding the 
failings of the criminal justice system in regard to rape, the substantial insti-
tutional and empirical evidence described in this Article supports the same 
conclusions. Surveys of police, studies of police-generated crime data, and 
extensive investigative journalism all point to systemic failure by police to 
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investigate rape cases. Additionally, the evidence based upon police clear-
ance rates and submitted crime data shows that the problems of police gate-
keeping are getting worse, not better. 
Until police gatekeeping in rape cases is addressed, even the most well-
intentioned statutory and evidentiary reforms will fail if not coupled with 
changes to policing practices. The role of police gatekeeping in short-
circuiting rape cases is too fundamental to overlook. History has shown that 
there is no trickle-down effect from trial-focused reforms on policing practic-
es. Whether the reforms or statutes suggested in this Article are adopted, 
hopefully the arguments herein will at least encourage scholars and activists 
to stop obsessing over consent standards, rape shield laws, and other trial-
level reforms. Unless attention is redirected at the most significant bottleneck 
in rape criminal justice, police, there simply will not be any meaningful pro-
gress made in decreasing sexual violence in America. Society will continue to 
overlook that basic reality at the peril of people across the country. 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL FEDERAL STATUTE 
TITLE I: ENHANCING POLICE RESPONSIVENESS TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
COMPLAINTS 
Congress finds that the high incidence of sexual violence in the United 
States threatens the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and 
its citizens. To prevent sexual violence and to insure the greater safety of the 
people, law enforcement efforts must be better coordinated, intensified, and 
made more effective at all levels of government. 
Congress finds further that sexual violence is primarily, but not exclu-
sively, a problem that must be dealt with by State and local governments if 
it is to be controlled effectively. 
It is therefore the declared policy of the Congress to assist State and 
local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at eve-
ry level by national assistance. It is the purpose of this Title to (1) encour-
age States and units of general local government to prepare and adopt com-
prehensive plans based upon their evaluation of State and local problems of 
law enforcement; (2) authorize grants to States and units of local govern-
ment in order to improve and strengthen law enforcement; and (3) encour-
age research and development directed toward the improvement of law en-
forcement and the development of new methods for the prevention and re-
duction of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals. 
PART A—LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 
SECTION 101: AUTHORITY – All States, Tribal governments of federally 
recognized Indian tribes, and units of local government, as defined by the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013: 
 (1) receiving federal funds as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act, whether or not specifically authorized by the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013; 
 (2) that accept federal funds or assistance as part of this Act; 
 (3) having been the location of sexual violence having a nexus with in-
terstate commerce, foreign commerce, or commerce from or to Indian 
Country; or 
 (4) having had persons commit sexual violence and travel in interstate 
commerce, foreign commerce, or commerce from or to Indian Country; 
shall be subject to the provisions of this Act. 
SECTION 102: REQUIREMENTS – All States and units of local govern-
ment shall insure that: 
 (1) while recognizing the inherent resource constraints present in any 
governmental unit, police officers fully investigate all rape or sexual as-
sault complaints as outlined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
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(FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting Program before determining that any 
such complaint is false or unfounded; 
 (2) all crime data submitted through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report-
ing Program or National Incident-Based Reporting System includes in-
formation about all reported rapes in each jurisdiction; 
 (3) no police department offers financial or professional incentives or 
rewards that encourage police to clear rape and sexual assault cases 
without full investigation; 
 (4) police officers whose duties include any role in sexual assault and/or 
rape cases in their jurisdictions are given regular training that: 
a. insures best practices when interviewing persons reporting 
having been victims of sexual violence; 
b. is culturally competent as to differing norms and behavior of 
responses of victims of sexual violence when interviewed; 
and 
c. includes the best available research from various disciplines 
about the rates of false reporting of rape and sexual assault. 
 (5) police officers who fail to fully investigate complaints of sexual as-
sault or rape, or assign others to fail to do so, as described in this Act are 
subject to appropriate discipline. Such discipline, at a minimum, will in-
sure that no police officer is employed who has failed on at least three 
occasions to fully investigate complaints of sexual assault or rape in any 
jurisdiction; 
 (6) potential evidence contained within a sexual assault kit (SAK), sex-
ual assault forensic evidence (SAFE) kit, sexual assault evidence collec-
tion kit (SAECK), sexual offense evidence collection (SOEC) kit, or 
physical evidence recovery kit (PERK) will be tested without delay; 
 (7) the cost of a SAK, SAFE kit, SAECK, SOEC kit, or PERK shall 
either be paid by either the State, unit of local government, or health in-
surance company and not the person tested; and 
 (8) police officers submit all appropriate information found as the result 
of testing of a SAK, SAFE kit, SAECK, SOEC kit, or PERK to the FBI’s 
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) without delay. 
SECTION 103: GRANTS – For the next five fiscal years, the Attorney 
General shall make the following funds and assistance available to all 
States, Tribal governments of federally recognized Indian tribes, and units 
of local government, as defined by the Violence Against Women Reauthori-
zation Act of 2013, for: 
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 (1) comprehensive police training for all police officers in the jurisdic-
tion who have any normal role in sexual violence cases. Such training 
will comply with the requirements of Section 102(4) of this Act; and 
 (2) technological assistance for use of federal and state databases which 
collect forensic and other evidence of perpetrators of sexual violence. 
PART B – COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
SECTION 101: NON-COMPLIANCE – Any State, Tribal government of 
federally recognized Indian tribes, or unit of local government who fails to 
meet the Requirements of this Act shall: 
 (1) be immediately denied any funding or assistance provided under this 
Act, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013; 
 (2) compensate the Federal Government of the United States of Ameri-
ca for any costs accrued by the failure to meet the terms of this Act; and 
 (3) be subject to immediate audit review by the Attorney General for 
compliance in all other federal crime programs. 
SECTION 102: ACCOUNTABILITY – All grants awarded by the Attorney 
General under this Act shall be subject to the following accountability pro-
visions: 
(1) Audit Requirement – beginning in the first fiscal year beginning 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in each fiscal year thereafter, 
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall conduct audits of 
recipients of grants under this Act to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of 
funds by grantees. The Inspector General shall determine the appropriate 
number of grantees to be audited each year; and 
(2) Annual Reports – each jurisdiction receiving grants under this Act 
shall submit annual reports to the Attorney General concerning the status of 
compliance of that jurisdiction with the provisions of this Act. 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL STATE STATUTE284 
TITLE I: ENHANCING POLICE RESPONSIVENESS TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
COMPLAINTS 
The State finds that the high incidence of sexual violence threatens the 
peace, security, and general welfare. To prevent sexual violence and to in-
sure the greater safety of the people, law enforcement efforts must be better 
coordinated, intensified, and made more effective at all levels of govern-
ment. 
PART A—LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 
SECTION 101: REQUIREMENTS – All units of local government shall in-
sure that: 
 (1) while recognizing the inherent resource constraints present in any 
governmental unit, police officers fully investigate all rape or sexual as-
sault complaints as outlined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting Program before determining that any 
such complaint is false or unfounded; 
 (2) all crime data submitted through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report-
ing Program or National Incident-Based Reporting System includes in-
formation about all reported rapes in each jurisdiction; 
 (3) no police department offers financial or professional incentives or 
rewards that encourage police to clear rape and sexual assault cases 
without full investigation; 
 (4) police officers whose duties include any role in sexual assault and/or 
rape cases in their jurisdictions are given regular training that: 
 a. insures best practices when interviewing persons reporting 
having been victims of sexual violence; 
 b. is culturally competent as to differing norms and behavior of 
responses of victims of sexual violence when interviewed; 
and 
 c. includes the best available research from various disciplines 
about the rates of false reporting of rape and sexual assault. 
 (5) police officers who fail to fully investigate complaints of sexual as-
sault or rape, or assign others to fail to do so, as described in this Act are 
subject to appropriate discipline. Such discipline, at a minimum, will in-
sure that no police officer is employed who has failed on at least three 
occasions to fully investigate complaints of sexual assault or rape in any 
jurisdiction; 
                                                                                                                           
 284 Because each state’s governmental design is different, the provisions in this model statute 
would obviously need to be tailored to the specifics of the relevant state. 
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 (6) potential evidence contained within a sexual assault kit (SAK), sex-
ual assault forensic evidence (SAFE) kit, sexual assault evidence collec-
tion kit (SAECK), sexual offense evidence collection (SOEC) kit, or 
physical evidence recovery kit (PERK) will be tested without delay; 
 (7) the cost of a SAK, SAFE kit, SAECK, SOEC kit, or PERK shall 
either be paid by either the State, unit of local government, or health in-
surance company and not the person tested; and 
 (8) police officers submit all appropriate information found as the result 
of testing of a SAK, SAFE kit, SAECK, SOEC kit, or PERK to the FBI’s 
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) without delay. 
SECTION 103: GRANTS – For the next five fiscal years, the State shall 
make the following funds and assistance available to all units of local gov-
ernment for: 
 (1) comprehensive police training for all police officers in the jurisdic-
tion who have any normal role in sexual violence cases. Such training 
will comply with the requirements of Section 101(4) of this Act; and 
 (2) technological assistance for use of federal and state databases which 
collect forensic and other evidence of perpetrators of sexual violence. 
PART B – COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
SECTION 101: NON-COMPLIANCE – Any unit of local government who 
fails to meet the Requirements of this Act shall: 
 (1) be immediately denied any funding or assistance provided under this 
Act; 
 (2) compensate the State for any costs accrued by the failure to meet the 
terms of this Act; and 
 (3) be subject to immediate audit review by the State for compliance in 
all other federal crime programs. 
SECTION 102: ACCOUNTABILITY – All grants awarded by the State un-
der this Act shall be subject to the following accountability provisions: 
 (1) Audit Requirement – beginning in the first fiscal year beginning 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in each fiscal year there-
after, the State shall conduct audits of recipients of grants under this Act 
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of funds by grantees. State shall de-
termine the appropriate number of grantees to be audited each year; and 
 (2) Annual Reports – each jurisdiction receiving grants under this Act 
shall submit annual reports to the State concerning the status of compli-
ance of that jurisdiction with the provisions of this Act. 
